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1. Introduction
Public-sector pay is not set in competitive markets. Public-sector unionization is high
(Visser, 2006), and public-sector unions are strong and active politically (DiSalvo, 2010). As
a consequence, the pay of public-sector workers is likely to reflect, in part, the extraction of
rents from taxpayers. Indeed, the potential for public-sector workers to influence pay (and
employment) has long been noted by labor economists (Freeman, 1986).
The issue of public-sector pay has come to the fore lately, in part because of state budget
woes. The media and blogosphere are replete with stories about overpaid public-sector workers,
from prison guards in California,1 to teachers and other public-sector workers in New Jersey,2
to unionized public-sector workers generally.3 Not surprisingly, the reality is more complex.
Looking at the public sector in the aggregate reveals that, currently, public-sector workers are
not overpaid. Although for both men and women, data from 2000 reveal a positive pay gap
between the public and private sectors (about 11 percent for men and 20 percent for women),
in earnings regressions with the usual controls, there is a negative pay differential for working
in the public sector of 6 percent for men, and no pay differential for women (Borjas, 2002).4
On the other hand, researchers have pointed to pensions and other benefits for public-sector
workers that are very generous, particularly when account is taken of underfunded pension
liabilities and how they are calculated (Biggs, 2010a, 2010b; DiSalvo, 2010). In addition, the
power of public-sector unions, as exemplified by the extensive union involvement in efforts to
recall governors in California,5 suggests that substantial scope for rent extraction may exist.
Freeman (1986), however, argued against the ability of public-sector unions to extract high
rents, using a Tiebout-sorting view of the world: “Citizens unhappy with [the] level of public
services can move elsewhere, reducing the taxable population and thus the ability to pay public
sector wages. Mobility places great constraints on public-sector union bargaining power” (p.
51). But this view need not rule out specific cases where public-sector workers are overpaid.
Indeed, casual inference based on the stories cited above suggests that high public-sector pay
may be a phenomenon confined to particular states—specifically those states well endowed
with the amenities often emphasized by urban economists. Facing a high willingness-to-pay on
the part of potential residents to live in a high-amenity state, public-sector workers may have
more leeway for rent extraction, leading to a link between public-sector wages and amenities.
The purpose of the present paper is to test for such a link.
Initial suggestive evidence for this wage-amenity connection is contained in Figure 1, which
plots state-level public-sector wage residuals (representing the wage component not explained
by the usual controls) against state-level private-sector wage residuals.6 The solid line has slope
equal to one, so that points on the line represent a state in which the public-sector and private-
sector wage premia for the state are equal. While most of points are in fact below the line, note
the identities of the states above the line—states where the public-sector premium is larger
than the private-sector premium and hence where public-sector workers are “overpaid.” These
states have warm weather (California and Florida), low rainfall (Nevada), a coastal location
(e.g., New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island), and large, dense urban areas (New York,
New Jersey, and California). Thus, Figure 1 suggests that rent extraction may be occurring
in places where people like to live.
We develop and test a model that explores this hypothesis. Building on existing work on
the public sector (e.g., O’Brien, 1992; Rose and Sonstelie, 2010; Zax and Ichniowski, 1988),
we presume that public-sector workers—especially unionized ones—have some ability to de-
termine their pay (and perhaps also their levels of employment) through the political process.
Consistent with Freeman’s argument, we would expect that this political power would face
limitations, because if public-sector workers extract rents (and thus taxes) that are too high
relative to the level of desired publicly-produced goods and services, then taxpayers will vote
with their feet, depriving public-sector workers of the tax base from which to extract rents.
However, in locations with strong amenities, public-sector workers may have more ability to
extract rents, as these amenities drive wedges between the utility of taxpayers in different
locations that public-sector workers can exploit.
Our stylized theoretical model takes an extreme viewpoint by assuming that the public
sector is fully controlled by its workers, who have the power to set the public-good level as
well as taxes, which cover both the nonlabor cost of the good as well as their own high wages.
These workers set taxes along with the level of the public good to maximize the public-sector
wage, taking the induced migration between regions into account. The key results of the
model connect the wage levels of both public and private-sector workers to the level of a
region’s amenities. As captured in Figure 1, the main empirical hypothesis is that amenities
raise the public-sector wage relative to the private-sector wage, a consequence of the improved
rent-extraction potential in a high-amenity region. The model also predicts that public-sector
wages should be higher in an absolute sense in high-amenity regions.
Our model is related to the large literature on tax competition, in which local governments
make fiscal decisions taking into account the footloose nature of business investment, which
is deterred by high local taxes. Here, though, the focus is on mobile private-sector workers
rather than mobile business capital. Within this literature, which is surveyed by Wilson (1999),
the paper is most closely connected to models of tax competition by rent-seeking rather than
benevolent local governments, as exemplified by Edwards and Keen (1996). Our framework also
shares elements of models in the Roback (1982) tradition, which show how amenity differences
affect interregional patterns of wages and house prices.
The model’s predictions are tested using Current Population Survey data. We estimate
standard log wage regressions that include a public-sector wage differential, a wage differential
associated with local amenities, and an interaction between these two differentials. The in-
teraction coefficient reveals that the public-sector wage differential is larger in the presence of
strong amenities, as predicted by the theory. The results are remarkably robust. They emerge
for public-sector workers overall, and for two large groups of public-sector workers that are
the focus of much attention with regard to pay: teachers and prison guards (or correctional
officers). Moreover, the evidence is particularly strong for unionized public-sector workers, who
are presumably better able to exercise political power to extract rents.
The paper’s empirical work bears a close resemblance to empirical studies in the Roback
tradition. A common approach to implementing the Roback (1982) model, as exemplified
by Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988), is to estimate two regressions relating individual
wages and house prices to regional amenity levels.7 The results of these regressions are then
merged to generate estimates of consumer amenity valuations, building on the theory. Our key
regression is similar to a Roback-style wage regression, except that it includes, along with the
usual amenity measures, terms that interact the amenity levels with a public-worker dummy
variable. The coefficients of the (uninteracted) amenity levels give the usual impact of amenities
on private-sector wages, while the interaction coefficients give the differential amenity effect on
public-sector wages, which the theory predicts is positive. Moreover, if unionized workers have
more ability to extract rents, then their amenity interaction coefficient should be larger than
the coefficient for public-sector workers as a whole. The empirical results strongly conform
to all these expectations. In addition, they confirm the prediction that amenities raise the
absolute level of public-sector wages.
Section 2 of the paper develops the theoretical model, while section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 presents the empirical work, and section 5 offers conclusions.
2. Model
2.1. Basic analysis
The economy has two regions, with region 1 having a positive amenity level and region
2 a zero level (a normalization). Region 1’s amenity could have a consumption component
(denoted a) as well as a component that raises worker productivity (denoted b). There are
two groups of residents in each region: private-sector workers, who are mobile across regions,
and public-sector workers, who are immobile.8 This latter group has captured control of the
public sector in each region, and thus has the ability to set the public-good level as well as
taxes.9 Taxes pay for the cost of the public good while also covering rent extraction by the
public-sector workers, in the form of excessive wages. For simplicity, public-sector workers do
not consume the good they produce, so that only private workers consume the public good
and pay taxes. As seen below, relaxation of this assumption has no effect on the results. In
setting the level of the good as well as taxes, public workers play a Nash game across regions,
taking account of the fact that their decisions affect the location choices of private workers.
Let zi denote the public-good level in region i, and suppose that the good is a publicly
produced private good with cost per unit normalized to unity. Per capita cost is then just zi,
being independent of the size of the private-worker population. This cost represents only the
cost of nonlabor inputs, not including the wages of public-sector workers, which are a separate
expense covered by rent extraction. Note that, with the size of the public work force fixed in
each region, an increase in zi is achieved solely by raising non-labor inputs, whose costs are
assumed to rise in proportion to zi.
Let xi denote consumption of the private good and ai denote the consumption amenity
level in region i. We assume that the preferences of private workers are quasi-linear and given
by
xi + ai + v(zi). (1)
In (1), suitable measurement allows to the amenity to enter utility in linear fashion, just like
xi.
10 Since public-sector workers do not consume the public good (an assumption relaxed
below), their utility is instead equal to the amenity plus x consumption.
Let Li denote the number of private-sector workers in region i. The economy’s total
number of private workers is fixed at L, so that L1+L2 = L. Letting bi denote the level of the
production amenity in region i, private-sector output in the region is given by f(Li)+biLi, with
the wage equal to f ′(Li)+bi (f
′′ < 0 holds). The production amenity thus affects productivity
in an additive fashion.11 Profit from private production is assumed to flow to agents outside
the economy.
Let Ri denote public-sector rent extraction per private-sector worker. Since taxes per
private-sector worker are then equal to zi + Ri, the private-sector worker’s budget constraint
is xi + zi +Ri = f
′(Li) + bi. Utility for a region-1 worker is then
f ′(L1) + b1 − z1 − R1 + a1 + v(z1). (2)
Since the amenity components enter additively in (2), they can be collapsed into a single term,
denoted A, with b1 = αA and a1 = (1− α)A, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. A pure consumption amenity
corresponds to α = 0, while a pure production amenity corresponds to α = 1.12 A “composite”
amenity has an intermediate value of α. Although most of the analysis is unaffected by the
nature of the amenity, region 1’s private-sector wage, which equals f ′(L1) + αA, depends on
its source.
Migration between the regions must equate utilities. Recalling that no amenity is present
in region 2, the equilibrium condition
f ′(L1) − z1 − R1 + A + v(z1) = f
′(L− L1) − z2 − R2 + v(z2) (3)
must hold. Condition (3) determines L1 and thus the division of population as a function of the
decision variables z1, R1, z2, and R2, as well as A. Holding the decisions variables constant,
an increase in A will shift workers toward region 1, with L1 rising. Although an increase in
region 1’s amenity thus entices workers to live there, holding the z’s and the R’s fixed, our
interest lies in exploring how a stronger pull of the amenity, as reflected in a larger A, affects
the levels of these decision variables, as chosen by rent-seeking public-sector workers.
Recognizing the dependence of L1 on the decision variables, public workers in region i
choose zi and Ri to maximize their income, taking the other region’s choices as given in Nash
fashion. To characterize the solution to this problem, consider region 1’s decisions and note
that differentiation of (3) yields
∂L1
∂z1
=
1− v′(z1)
f ′′(L1) + f ′′(L− L1)
(4)
∂L1
∂R1
=
1
f ′′(L1) + f ′′(L− L1)
< 0. (5)
Greater rent extraction in region 1 naturally reduces its population, while the effect of z1
depends on the sign of the numerator in (4), which determines whether the good is over or
underprovided relative to the efficient level (an increase in z1 raises L1 when the good is
underprovided, with v′ > 1).
Total rent extraction by public workers in region 1 equals L1R1. With the number of
such workers fixed at M in each region, rent per public-sector worker (which corresponds
to the public-sector wage) equals L1R1/M . Thus, maximizing the public-sector wage means
maximizing L1R1 by proper choice of z1 and R1, viewing z2 and R2 as fixed. The first-order
condition for z1 is
13
∂L1R1
∂z1
= R1
∂L1
∂z1
= R1
1− v′(z1)
f ′′(L1) + f ′′(L− L1)
= 0, (6)
using (4). This condition reduces to v′(z1) = 1, which implies that the public-good is chosen
efficiently (with marginal benefit equal to the unitary marginal cost). With the public-good
level set in socially optimal fashion, private-sector workers are encouraged to live in region
1, allowing more rent to be extracted by public-sector workers. Let z∗ denote the optimal
public-good level, which is independent of the level of amenities (an outcome that follows from
quasi-linear utility).
The first order condition for R1 is
∂L1R1
∂R1
= L1 + R1
∂L1
∂R1
= L1 +
R1
f ′′(L1) + f ′′(L − L1)
= 0, (7)
using (5). Rearranging (7) allows R1 to be written in terms of L1:
R1 = −L1[f
′′(L1) + f
′′(L− L1)]. (8)
Public workers in region 2 maximize (L − L1)R2 by choosing z2 and R2, and analogous
solutions emerge. The public-good level satisfies v′(z2) = 1, thus equaling z
∗, and R2 is given
by
R2 = −(L− L1)[f
′′(L1) + f
′′(L− L1)]. (9)
The Nash-equilibrium level of L1 can be found by using (8) and (9) to eliminate R1 and
R2 in the migration condition (3). Making these substitutions yields
f ′(L1)+L1[f
′′(L1)+f
′′(L−L1)] + A = f
′(L−L1)+(L−L1)[f
′′(L1)+f
′′(L−L1)], (10)
where the terms involving z∗ cancel. This equation determines L1 as a function of A.
2.2. The effect of amenities on public and private-sector wages
Using (10), the main questions of interest can be addressed: how do amenities affect public
and private-sector wages? The first step is differentiate (10), which yields
∂L1
∂A
= −{3f ′′(L1) + 3f
′′(L− L1) + (2L1 − L)[f
′′′(L1)− f
′′′(L− L1)]}
−1. (11)
Despite the apparent ambiguity of the sign of (11) (a consequence of the presence of f ′′′), the
expression can be signed using a stability condition for the equilibrium. However, the subse-
quent discussion is simpler when it relies on a local analysis around the symmetric outcome
(where A = 0), in which case the sign of (11) is clear from inspection. With A = 0, L1 = L/2
holds and the last term in (11) drops out, so that
∂L1
∂A
= −
1
6f ′′(L/2)
> 0. (12)
Thus, region 1 (the high amenity region) has more private-sector workers than region 2. Note
that the derivative in (11) gives the change in L1 when a small amenity advantage is introduced
in region 1, starting from a situation where neither region has amenities.
The effect of A on the private-sector wage is driven by a change in the marginal product
of labor as a result of migration. In the case of a pure consumption amenity, which does not
directly affect the marginal product, the private-sector wage in region 1 falls as in-migration
depresses f ′. But with a composite amenity, a direct productivity effect interacts with the
migration effect, making the change in the marginal product ambiguous and dependent on the
strength of the direct effect. Specifically, since the wage equals f ′(L1) + αA, the effect of A is
given by
f ′′
∂L1
∂A
+ α = f ′′
(
−
1
6f ′′
)
+ α = α −
1
6
, (13)
using (12). So while the private-sector wage falls with A in the case of a pure consumption
amenity, where α = 0, the wage rises with A in the case of a pure production amenity, where
α = 1 and (13) equals 5/6. With a composite amenity, the wage falls only if the consumption
component is large, with α < 1/6.
Since region 2 loses workers, the private-sector wage rises there regardless of the nature of
region 1’s amenity. The wage derivative is equal to f ′′∂L2/∂A = −f
′′∂L1/∂A = 1/6, using
(12).
To find the effect of amenities on the public-sector wage, (8) can be used to write
L1R1
M
= −
L2
1
M
[f ′′(L1) + f
′′(L − L1)]. (14)
Differentiation then yields
∂L1R1/M
∂A
= −
1
M
{2L1[f
′′(L1) + f
′′(L− L1)] + L
2
1(f
′′′(L1)− f
′′′(L− L1)]}
∂L1
∂A
. (15)
Evaluating (15) at the symmetric equilibrium using (12) yields
∂L1R1/M
∂A
= −4(L/2M)f ′′(L/2)
∂L1
∂A
=
L
3M
> 0. (16)
In addition, differentiating of (L− L1)R2 yields
∂(L− L1)R2/M
∂A
= −
L
3M
< 0. (17)
Therefore, regardless of whether the amenity affects consumption or production, total rent
extraction, and thus the public-sector wage, is higher in region 1 than in region 2. With a
stronger amenity tending to pull private-sector workers toward region 1, public-sector workers
are thus able to extract more rent as A increases. Because L1 is large for any given R1 when
A is large, public-sector workers enjoy a bigger population base for rent extraction, allowing
them to better tolerate the population loss resulting from this behavior and thus to pursue it
more aggressively.
Note that when the amenity has a consumption component, the increase in A yields also
yields nonpecuniary amenity benefits to region 1’s public-sector workers, compounding their
gain from a higher wage. Since public-sector workers are immobile, however, no migration
force works to offset these benefits (region 2’s public-sector workers cannot relocate).
A key final question concerns how the public-sector wage gap between the high- and low-
amenity regions compares to the private-sector gap. Since the public-sector wage rises (falls) at
the same rate in region 1 (2) as A increases, the regional public-sector wage gap is proportional
to twice the relevant derivative from (16), or 2L/3M . Since the private-sector wage changes
at a rate equal to α − 1/6 in region 1 while rising at a rate of 1/6 in region 2, the regional
wage gap is proportional to (α− 1/6)− 1/6, or α− 1/3, which can take either sign. Thus, the
regional public-sector wage gap exceeds the private-sector wage gap when
2L
3M
> α −
1
3
. (18)
When α is small, the right-hand side of (13) is negative, indicating that the private-sector
wage is lower in region 1 than in region 2, an outcome that makes the regional gap negative
and thus lower than the positive public-sector wage gap. But when α > 1/3, the private-sector
gap is positive, making the relationship between the public and private gaps not immediately
clear. But since the right-hand side of (18) is less than 1, the inequality will be satisfied when
2L/3M > 1 or when L > (3/2)M = (3/4)(2M). The latter inequality states that the total
private work force in both regions (L) is larger than 3/4 of the total public work force, which
equals 2M .14 Since the private work force is in reality much larger than the public work force,
this condition is realistic, and the regional public-sector wage gap exceeds the private-sector
gap. This conclusion and (16) yield the main empirical hypotheses generated by the model:
Proposition 1. Under the maintained assumptions, amenities raise the absolute level
of public-sector wages while also raising these wages relative to private-sector wages.
In other words, the public-sector wage gap between the high- and low-amenity regions is
always positive, and it exceeds the private-sector wage gap, which can be either positive
or negative depending on the nature of the amenity.
In the case of a pure consumption amenity, the differential effect of the amenity on pub-
lic and private-sector wages is transparent. The in-migration generated by an increase in
the amenity depresses labor’s marginal product and thus the private-sector wage, while the
population gain is exploited by public-sector workers to raise total rent extraction and thus
their individual wage. With a pure production amenity, the rise in the private-sector wage
compounds the benefit from in-migration, expanding the scope of possible rent extraction and
leading to a public-sector wage increase that exceeds the private increase.
Note that this latter outcome would be reversed if the public work force were much larger
than the private-sector work force, so that (18) is not satisfied. With results of rent extraction
needing to be shared across many public-sector workers, the increase in the individual wage
would then be smaller, making the public-sector wage gap between high and low-amenity
regions less than the private-sector gap.
2.3. Adding housing consumption
The previous results are mostly unaffected under several modifications of the model. First,
the assumption that public-sector workers do not consume the public good can be relaxed
without affecting any of the previous results. The appendix demonstrates this conclusion by
allowing the public good to enter the utility functions of both types of workers while requiring
public-sector workers to pay taxes.
The analysis so far suppresses housing consumption and housing prices, which play a
key role in Roback-style models. However, these elements can also be added to the current
framework without substantially affecting any of the previous results, provided the addition
is done in a certain way. Specifically, private-sector workers are assumed to consume land
(interpreted as housing), while public workers are not consumers of land and firms do not
require a land input, using only labor. Making the latter two groups of agents land-users
would require major changes to the model, with uncertain effects on the results.
Let q1 and q2 denote individual land consumption by private workers in the two regions,
and let the (additively separable) utility from housing consumption be s(qi). Letting p1 denote
the land price in region 1, the utility expression on the left-hand side of (3) is then augmented
by the terms s(q1)− p1q1. Since the first-order condition for choice of q1 is s
′(q1) = p1, these
new terms can be replaced by s(q1)−s
′(q1)q1. The analogous expression s(q2)−s
′(q2)q2 appears
on the right-hand side of (3).
With two new unknowns, q1 and q2, appearing in the model, additional equilibrium con-
ditions are needed, and these conditions come from market-clearing requirements. Letting
the residential land area in each region be fixed and normalized to one, the market-clearing
conditions are L1q1 = 1 and L2q2 = 1. For region 1, q1 is then given by 1/L1, so that the new
terms on the left-hand side of (3) become
s(1/L1)− s
′(1/L1)/L1 ≡ h(L1), (19)
where h′(L1) = s
′′(1/L1)L
−3
1
< 0. Let g(L1) ≡ f
′(L1)+h(L1), with g
′(L1) = f
′′(L1)+h
′(L1) <
0. Then, the equal-utility condition in (3) can be written as
g(L1) − z1 − R1 + A + v(z1) = g(L − L1) − z2 − R2 + v(z2) (20)
Since g(·) takes the place of f ′(·), and since both functions are decreasing in L1, the analysis
leading to the key derivatives (11) and (12) is unaffected, with g′ replacing f ′′ in (12). In
addition, the impact of the amenity on public-sector rent is unaffected, with (16) and (17)
continuing to hold.
Although the calculation of A’s impact on the private-sector wage is altered, the previous
conclusion on the effect of amenities on the wage gap is unchanged. With (12) using g′ instead
of f ′′, the wage derivative is
f ′′
∂L1
∂A
+ α = f ′′
(
−
1
6g′
)
+ α = α −
λ
6
, (21)
where λ = f ′′/g′ = f ′′/(f ′′ + h′) < 1 (the functions in this expression are evaluated at L/2).
Thus, the private-sector wage once again rises with the amenity level unless the consumption
component represents a large share of the total amenity effect (with α < λ/6). The regional
public-sector wage gap is again larger than the private-sector wage gap (which equals α−λ/3),
assuming that the previous condition on worker populations is satisfied.15 Proposition 1 thus
continues to hold.
This modified model also generates predictions about land prices. Since ∂L1/∂A > 0 and
s′′ < 0, it follows that region 1’s land price, given by p1 = s
′(1/L1) is increasing in A, with
region 2’s price decreasing in A. Thus, regardless of the nature of the amenity, land prices are
higher in region 1 than in region 2. This prediction, as well as those above, might be modified
in model that incorporates land consumption in a different fashion.16
A final point that is useful in the empirical work involves the comparison between the
amenity’s private-sector wage impact with and without housing consumption. As seen above,
when housing consumption is absent, the regional wage gap is proportional to α− 1/3. In the
presence of housing, the gap is α − λ/3, a larger quantity given λ < 1. The reason for this
relationship is that the increase in housing prices chokes off migration sooner in response to
an amenity gap, keeping wages farther apart.
A key implication of these two formulas is that, if the amenity’s consumption component is
large (α is small), the regional wage gap could be positive in the presence of housing (α−λ/3 >
0) but negative in housing’s absence (α − 1/3 < 0). Empirically, housing can be “removed”
from the model by holding housing prices constant in a regression that compares wages in
high- and low-amenity regions. The previous conclusion then says that, when the amenity has
a large consumption component, the private-sector wage comparison could show a negative
gap between high and low-amenity regions controlling for housing-price gaps while showing
a positive gap when prices are not controlled for. Such a contrast would indicate that the
amenity has an important consumption component along with its production effect.
2.4. Comparison to the Roback model
The present model differs from the standard Roback model in several ways. In addition
to the presence of rent-seeking public-sector workers, firms in the model do not use land, in
contrast to the standard assumption of a land input. Despite these differences, the predicted
amenity effects on private-sector wages and house prices are identical to those in the Roback
framework. In particular, the amenity lowers the private-sector wage in the consumption-
amenity case and raises it in the production amenity case, with the effect ambiguous in the
case of a composite amenity. In addition, regardless of the nature of the amenity, house prices
are higher in the high-amenity region than in the low-amenity region.
The new implications of the model concern the public-sector wage. This wage is higher in
the high-amenity region regardless of the nature of the amenity. In addition, under reasonable
conditions on the relative size of the public and private sectors, and regardless of the nature
of the amenity, the public-sector wage gap between high- and low-amenity regions is larger
than the private-sector wage gap (which can be negative). These predictions are tested in the
remainder of the paper.17
3. Data
The predictions of the model developed in the previous section are tested using data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) and other sources. The basic labor market data come
from the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files of the CPS, for the years 1994-2005. The
beginning year is the first year after the redesign of the CPS, and we extend the data set only
through 2005 because some of the other data items are measured in 2000 or earlier. We begin
with the standard ingredients of wage equations, for a sample with the following restrictions:
workers aged 18-64 earning wages or salaries (the self-employed and those working without pay
are excluded). The full set of variables extracted from the CPS and used in the regressions is
provided in the notes to the tables that follow. The dependent variable is the log of the hourly
wage either reported by hourly workers or constructed for non-hourly workers. The straight
wage is used, with some exclusions of obvious outliers.
A key characteristic of workers is their classification as either private or public. Within the
public sector, we distinguish between state, local and federal workers, and most of our analyses
focus on how amenities shift wage differentials for public-sector state and local workers. We
also explore the determinants of public-sector wage differentials for unionized public-sector
workers, based on union membership as reported in the CPS.
Some of our analyses also focus more narrowly on public-sector workers who are kinder-
garten, elementary, or secondary school teachers, or alternatively corrections officers, occupa-
tions that are highly concentrated in the public sector and constitute large shares of public-
sector employment.18 These classifications were made as consistent as possible across years,
given a change in occupational coding between 2002 and 2003.19 Moreover, the estimated wage
regressions include year dummy variables, so that any effects of changes in the composition of
the occupations that affect wage levels are accounted for in the analysis.
In addition to the labor market data, we define four amenity variables, indicating mild or
dry weather, proximity to navigable water, and population density. Mild is the negative of
the sum of the absolute values of the differences between monthly average temperature and
20 degrees Celsius, summed over January, April, July, and October. Dry is the negative of
the average monthly precipitation for those four months, in centimeters. The Mild and Dry
variables are from Mendelsohn et al. (1994), and both are county-weighted state averages, using
2006 Census population estimates as weights. Proximity is the negative of the average distance
from the state’s county centroids, weighted by county population, to the nearest coast, Great
Lake, or major river (Rappaport and Sachs, 2003). For each of these variables, a higher (less
negative) value is “better,” indicating less deviation from mild temperatures, less rain, and
a shorter distance to navigable water. Density is the tract-weighted population density (per
square mile) in the state, based on 1990 Census data (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). Note that
this variable differs from a simple density measure for a state because it is tract-weighted, with
the goal of measuring density where people in a state live. As a result, the density measure is
much higher than average tract density. Finally, we also make of use estimated state housing
price premia. These price measures are computed from 2000 Census data (5 percent sample),
as the state dummy variables in a hedonic regression for house prices. The computational
method is the same as in Albouy (2009), although applied at the state level. Costs are based
on both owned and rented homes and include utility costs, and the regression controls for
rental and condominium status, dwelling size, rooms, acreage, commercial use, kitchen and
plumbing facilities, and age of building.20
Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample observations, which include 1.75 million
private and public-sector workers. Almost 14 percent of the observations are for public state
or local workers, with almost 3 percent being federal. Unionized workers represent nearly 16
percent of the sample, and unionized state and local workers about 7 percent of the sample.
Descriptive statistics for the amenity variables are shown in Table 2. Note that North
Dakota’s temperatures are the least mild, while Florida’s are the mildest. Louisiana is the
least dry state while Nevada is the driest. Tiny coastal Delaware has the best water access,
while New Mexico is the state most remote from bodies of water. New York is the densest
state, while Arkansas is the least dense.
4. Empirical Findings
The regression model takes the following form:
ln(wis) = α + Xisβ + γPSis +
∑
k
δkA
k
s +
∑
k
θkPSisA
k
s + is, (22)
where wis is the wage for worker i in state s, Xis is a vector of characteristics for that worker,
PSis is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual works in the public sector, and
Aks is the level of amenity k in state s, with k = 1, 2, 3, 4. The hypotheses to be tested are:
θk > 0, indicating that amenities raise public-sector wages relative to private-sector wages; and
δk+θk > 0, indicating that amenities raise the absolute level of public sector-wages. Note that
the sign of δk (indicating the effect of an amenity on private-sector wages) could be positive or
negative depending on the nature of the amenity. The observations in (22) actually come from
multiple years, but this fact is suppressed for simplicity in writing the equation since the main
variables of interest (amenities) are time invariant. A complete equation would thus include
time indices and year fixed effects.
4.1. Benchmark regressions lacking a public-private distinction
As a benchmark, the first empirical specification (shown in Table 3) suppresses the distinc-
tion between private and public-sector workers, regressing the log of the wage on the amenity
variables along with the large set of non-amenity controls (worker characteristics, and year
fixed effects), whose coefficients are not reported. The first four columns show regressions
containing just a single amenity measure, while the regression in column 5 contains all four
measures. When included singly, Dry and Proximity have significantly positive coefficients,
while Proximity and Density’s coefficients are insignificant. When all four variables appear
together, Mild’s coefficient remains insignificant while the remaining amenity coefficients are
all significantly positive.
With the public-worker share in the sample being small, the results in Table 3 are presum-
ably driven mainly by the private-worker observations. Since the analysis in section 2 shows
that a positive private-sector wage effect requires an amenity to have a production component,
the positive coefficients for Dry, Proximity and Density evidently indicate that each of these
amenities increases worker productivity in the private sector. Given the substantial evidence
on agglomeration economies (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004), the positive wage effect of
density comes as no surprise. Less expected are the implied productivity benefits of a dry
climate and water access.
As explained in section 2.3, if housing prices are held constant, then the wage impact of
the amenity’s production component is attentuated, providing a better chance for the negative
influence of the consumption component to manifest itself. To investigate this possibility,
column 6 of Table 3 adds the state housing-price premium for 2000 to the regression. The
housing-price coefficient is itself positive and significant, indicating that wages are higher in
states with expensive housing. With housing prices included, the coefficients of Dry and
Proximity lose significance (the point estimates are negative), while the coefficients of Mild
and Density become significantly negative. These negative relationships, as well as the sign
changes for the insignificant coefficients, are what we would expect if each amenity has an
important consumption component (with high density being favorable). Therefore, the results
suggest that the four amenity variables contain both production and consumption components,
with the production effect tending to dominate (yielding the positive coefficients in column 5).
The theoretical analysis showed that, regardless of the nature of the amenity, house prices
should be higher in high- than in low-amenity regions. Table 4 tests this prediction by regress-
ing the state housing-price premium on the amenity variables. As can be seen in column 5, all
the amenity coefficients are significantly positive, as predicted.
Before turning to the regressions that distinguish between private and public-sector work-
ers, it is useful to sketch the connection between the results presented so far and the standard
empirical implementation of the Roback (1982) model, as seen in Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn
(1988). In the standard implementation, wage and house-price regressions like those in column
(5) of Tables 3 and 4 are estimated, and the results are then merged to generate estimates
of amenity consumption benefits, following guidance from the theory. For positive wage im-
pacts like those in column (5) of Table 3 to emerge, amenity production effects must dominate
consumption effects, just as in the present framework.
The previous literature also contains an analog to the regression in column 6 of Table 3. In
particular, Henderson (1982) shows theoretically that if a house-price measure is included as
a covariate in a Roback-style wage regression, then the resulting amenity coefficients directly
measure the consumption benefits of amenities. He carries out such an estimation, generating
plausible numerical values. By constrast, under the present model, a regression that controls for
house prices does not yield a direct measure of consumption benefits. But the regression gives
these benefits a better chance to show their existence by generating negative wage coefficients,
as explained in section 2.3.
4.2. Main results
To test the main prediction of the model, as embodied in Proposition 1, public and private-
sector workers must be distinguished. Accordingly, the regressions in columns 1-6 of Table 5
include a dummy variable identifying public state or local workers, and they also include
interactions of this variable with the amenity measures. Note that the dummy coefficient
reveals the difference in the levels of public and private-sector wages, while the interactions
show the difference in the wage impact of amenities between public and private-sector workers.
Before considering these results, it should be noted that we face a limitation in estimat-
ing the effects of amenities on wages. Because these amenities are time-invariant, we cannot
distinguish between actual effects of the amenities on wages and correlations between these
amenities and other unmeasured state-specific factors that affect wages. However, in our main
analyses described in this section, we are interested in the interactions between these ameni-
ties and public-sector employment. Thus, even if unmeasured state-specific factors influence
wages, as long as they do not affect the difference between wages for otherwise similar private-
and public-sector workers, these factors will not affect our results. Put equivalently, we can
identify how local amenities affect public-sector wage differentials in the face of unmeasured
state-specific influences on overall wage levels, even if we cannot identify the main effects of
amenities.21 Nonetheless, in some of the specifications reported below, we control for other
state-specific factors, including some that may affect the public-sector wage differentials that
we estimate.
The (uninteracted) amenity level coefficients in Table 5, which show the amenity impact
on private-sector wages, follow the same pattern as in Table 3, being significantly positive for
Dry, Proximity and Density in the regression in column 5 containing all the amenities. In
addition, the public-sector wage dummy is negative and significant, indicating that wages for
state or local public workers are about 5 percent less than private-sector wages, conditional on
all the covariates.
Turning to the interaction coefficients, the Proximity and Density coefficients are signifi-
cantly positive in the single-amenity regressions (columns 1-4), and both these coefficients as
well as the Mild interaction coefficient are significantly positive in the regression in column 5
containing all of the amenities. The null hypothesis that all the interaction coefficients are zero
can also be rejected at a high confidence level. These results provide strong confirmation of
the model’s predictions by showing that public-sector wages rise even more than private-sector
wages in the presence of amenities. Note also that, with both the amenity level and interac-
tion coefficients being positive, the results also indicate that public-sector wages are high in
absolute terms in high-amenity regions, matching the model’s prediction. The bottom panel
of Table 5 shows the sum of the level and interaction coefficients, with three out of four being
significantly positive.
As seen in column 6, controlling for housing prices once again reverses the signs of the
amenity impacts on private-sector wages, with all four point estimates negative and the Mild
and Density coefficients significant. However, the interaction coefficients remain positive, again
indicating that amenities raise public wages relative to private-sector wages when housing prices
are held constant. Since the theory predicts that public-sector wages should rise in an absolute
sense with amenities regardless of whether housing is present in the model, the sum of the
amenity level and interaction coefficients should then be positive regardless of whether or not
the regression controls for house prices. The bottom panel shows that this condition is met for
Proximity and Density, for which the summed coefficients are significantly positive.
Column 7 drops nonunionized public-sector workers from the sample, so that comparisons
are between unionized state or local public workers and private-sector workers (the sample size
falls to 1.6 million). The results are qualitatively similar to those in column (5). The amenity
level coefficients have the same pattern of signs and significance, while three of the interaction
coefficients are again positive and significant (Mild and Dry swap significance). Note that the
public-sector wage discount grows to 7 percent, evidently indicating that unionized workers
are in lower-paying public job categories. Column 8 shows that controlling for housing prices
leads to results very similar to those in column 6. Most important, perhaps, is the finding
that the estimated public-sector wage premiums associated with amenities are larger for three
out of the four amenities (and triple in size for Dry and Proximity), consistent with unions
being able to extract more rents. If the comparison is instead between nonunionized public-
sector workers and private workers, the wage premiums associated with amenities are smaller
than those reported in columns 5 and 6 (but still always positive, and significant for all of
the amenities except Dry in the specification with the housing-price premium included; results
available on request).
We next explore the robustness or sensitivity of these results along a number of dimen-
sions. First, it is possible that public-sector workers differ from other workers in observable
characteristics, and that it is these other characteristics that—for some reason—are associated
with wage differentials that vary with amenities. To address this question, Table 6 reports
estimates for various subsets of the sample, including urban vs. non-urban residents, more-
and less-educated workers, and workers in different race or ethnic groups. The estimates are
reported for the specification from column (8) of Table 5, focusing on the unionized public-
sector workers for whom the theoretical prediction as well as the evidence is stronger. As the
table shows, the results are largely unchanged within each of these subgroups, although not
surprisingly, the statistical significance of the estimates is sometimes a bit weaker.22
What do these estimates imply for actual public-sector vs. private-sector wage differentials?
To provide some idea of what the magnitudes mean, consider (from Table 2) the implied
difference in the public-sector wage differential for workers in the worst state compared to
the best state for each amenity. For example, for Mild, the implied effect of being located in
Florida instead of North Dakota is the difference in the amenity values in Table 2 multiplied by
the corresponding public-sector/amenity interaction coefficient of 0.0012, or a log differential
of 0.055 (or approximately 5.5 percent). For Dry, Proximity, and Density, the corresponding
magnitudes for the difference between the worst and best states are 2.5, 10.2, and 2.9 percent.
Effects of these magnitudes are non-neglible and plausible.23
In Table 7, public-sector workers are limited to those employed at the state level, excluding
local public workers. For local public-sector workers, the ability to extract rents may be weaker
in smaller localities (Rose and Sonstelie, 2010), or the statewide amenity measures may not
capture local amenities well. On the other hand, the local public-sector workers in large cities,
who make up a large share of the public-sector workforce in the state, may be among the
public-sector workers most able to extract rents. The results excluding these local workers,
however, are very similar to those in Table 5. The amenity level and interaction coefficients
are typically positive and significant in columns 5 and 7, a conclusion that also applies to the
sum of the coefficients. Several amenity-level coefficient signs switch to negative in columns 6
and 8 when housing prices are included, with interaction coefficients remaining positive. As
in Table 5, for three out of the four amenities, the associated public-sector wage premiums
are usually larger when we focus exclusively on public-sector workers who are unionized (and
weaker, although not reported in the table, when the focus is on nonunionized public-sector
workers).
4.3. Results for teachers and corrections officers
It is useful to test the model’s predictions on even narrower classes of public-sector workers,
specifically teachers and corrections officers. Table 8 shows distributional information for
elementary and secondary school teachers. Three quarters of such teachers are public workers,
with the rest being privately employed. Almost 10 percent of teachers self-report that they are
state-employed,24 while about half of all teachers are union members, regardless of sector.
Table 9 shows the previous regression specifications with public-sector workers limited to
state and local teachers. Only specifications with all of the amenity variables are reported. In
column 1, three amenity level coefficients are positive, again indicating higher private-sector
wages in high-amenity states. The teacher dummy coefficient shows that teachers earn 18
percent less than otherwise comparable nonteachers, while the coefficient for public workers
(all of whom are teachers) shows that these individuals earn 10 percent more than other
teachers. As in Table 5, three out of four amenity interaction coefficients are positive (Dry’s
effect is insignificant), showing that amenities raise public teacher salaries more than those of
private-sector workers. In two cases, the sum of the amenity level and interaction coefficients
is significantly positive, indicating higher absolute teacher wages in high-amenity states.
From column 2, the addition of the housing-price premium yields results that match previ-
ous findings, with all the amenity level coefficients turning negative (two are significant), while
the interaction terms retain their previous positive sign and significance. Column 3 adds the
student-teacher ratio interacted with the public-teacher dummy variable in order to control
for the quality of the work environment, which may be related to public-sector wage differ-
entials, either because the work environment affects wages or because the higher wages lead
to a higher student-teacher ratio.25 Note that the inclusion of this variable interacted with
public-sector employment addresses the issue raised earlier regarding other sources of state-
level variation in public-sector wage differentials. In this case, for example, student-teacher
ratios may vary across states, and this variation, in turn, may be related to the wage premium
for public-school teachers for reasons unrelated to local amenities. The interaction coefficient is
insignificant, indicating no relationship between public-sector wage differentials (for teachers)
and student-teacher ratios, and its inclusion has no effect on the main results regarding the
public-sector/amenity interactions. Columns 4-6 of Table 9 restrict public-sector teachers to
those that are unionized, and the results are largely unaffected.
Turning to the case of corrections officers, Table 10 gives distributional information. Among
corrections officers (who staff prisons and jails), 95 percent are state or local employees, and
more than half are union members. Table 11 shows regressions where state and local employees
are limited to corrections officers, and the results closely match previous patterns, despite
the much smaller number of public-sector workers for whom the results are identified. From
column 1, corrections officers earn 10 percent more than otherwise comparable workers, while
if they are public state or local employees, that premium is reduced to about 3 percent. The
positive amenity level coefficients again show that amenities raise private-sector wages, while
the positive interaction coefficients (three of which are again significant) indicate that the wages
of corrections officers rise by more than those of private workers in the presence of amenities.
The sum of the two coefficients is also significantly positive in three out of four cases.
Adding the housing-price premium generates now-familiar changes in the amenity impacts
on private-sector wages, as shown in column 2. Column 3 includes a work-environment mea-
sure, equal to inmates per officer, interacted with the corrections-officer dummy. This measure
controls for a potential source of across-state variation in public-sector wage differentials for
this particular set of public-sector workers. Its impact (along with that of a level effect) is
insignificant, and its inclusion does not affect the other results. Columns 4-6 restrict attention
to unionized corrections officers, and the results are mostly unchanged, although the effects of
amenities on the public-sector wage premium are generally stronger.
Finally, the regressions in Table 12 provide a falsification test by using federal rather
than state or local workers to represent public-sector employees. With federal wages mostly
uniform across the country,26 or in some cases reflecting local private-sector pay, public-sector
wage differentials in federal employment should not show the same positive relationship to
state amenities as the differentials for state and local workers. This prediction is confirmed
by the results in column 1, where we never find a positive public-sector/amenity interaction
coefficient.27 Restricting attention to unionized federal workers (column 2) has little effect on
the results.28
5. Conclusion
Non-competitive influences on public-sector pay have been long debated. On the one hand,
the lack of a competitive market, the presence and continuing strength of public-sector labor
unions, and the high level of political involvement of these unions all suggest that public-sector
workers—particularly when unionized—can influence their pay and employment. On the other
hand, public-sector pay (and employment) decisions are not made in a vacuum, as taxpayers
can migrate away from locations in which public-sector goods and services are provided in an
excessively costly fashion.
The presence of local amenities, however, can grant public-sector workers a form of mono-
poly power that lets them extract more rents. People can only consume the beaches and
sunshine of southern California, or benefit from the higher productivity of dense urban areas
like Manhattan, by living nearby, and public-sector workers can therefore extract rents up to
the point where those who pay the rents are induced to leave these high-amenity areas.
The data bear out this connection between amenities and rent-seeking behavior. When we
estimate standard log wage regressions, we find that public-sector wage differentials are in fact
larger in the presence of strong amenities, as are the absolute levels of public-sector wages. The
results are the same whether we look at state and local workers overall or just state workers,
and when we look at important subsets of these workers who receive a lot of attention in
the debate over public-sector pay—teachers and prison guards. Furthermore, the relationship
between public-sector wage differentials and amenities is stronger for unionized public-sector
workers, consistent with their greater ability to extract rents through both organization and
influence over the political process. The data also pass a falsification test, given that we find
no evidence of a connection between wage differentials for federal workers and these same
amenities.
Despite our compelling evidence, the paper by no means offers a “complete” theory of
public-sector wage determination. Surely, institutional factors such as the cross-state variation
in labor laws studied by Freeman and Valetta (1988) matter, as does the productivity of
public-sector workers and the level of alternative wages they can earn in the private sector.
Developing a fuller understanding of these various influences on public-sector wages can clarify
the policy debate on public-sector pay, and may prove useful in considering possible reforms
to reduce rent extraction by public-sector workers.
Finally, our empirical analysis is limited to state-level variation in local amenities and
public-sector wage differentials. Although it may be hard to define the scope of local markets,
richer data on local amenities and these wage differentials would permit additional tests of our
hypothesis. In addition, the same considerations regarding rent extraction may apply to other
workers who are not necessarily concentrated in the public sector but for whom pay is strongly
influenced by government regulations, political power (in part through unionization), and other
non-competitive forces. Finally, in principle our analysis can be applied to differences in fringe
benefits between the private and public sector, and studying the connection between benefits
and amenities may be particularly informative in light of recent concerns over public-sector
pensions.
Appendix
Adding public-worker z consumption
The preceding results are unaffected when public-sector workers consume the public good
along with private-sector workers. Suppose that, instead of caring only about x, public workers
value the public good and pay the same tax as private workers. This tax equals zi+Ri, so that
public workers are paying to cover their own rent extraction (Ri now denotes rent extraction
per worker, public and private). Their income equals w + (Li +M)Ri/M , where w is some
fixed base wage, and where the second term is rent per public worker (of which there are M
in each jurisdiction). This term equals the rent component of the tax (Ri) times the total
number of workers paying the tax (Li +M), divided by the number of public workers.
A public worker’s budget constraint is then xi = w+(Li+M)Ri/M−zi−Ri = w+LiRi/M−
zi. Note that the portion of the tax covering rent extraction cancels the corresponding part of
income, so that rent extraction continues to yield LiRi/M per public worker. Assuming that
public-sector workers share private-worker preferences, the public-sector workers in region 1
seek to maximize
w + L1R1/M − z1 + v(z1) (a1)
subject to the migration constraint in (3). The choice variables are z1, R1, and L1, with z2
and R2 viewed as fixed.
Letting µ denote the multiplier associated with the constraint, the first-order condition for
choice of z1 is (1 + µ)[v
′(z1) − 1] = 0. Therefore, the condition v
′(z1) = 1 again emerges, so
that z1 = z
∗. But with z1 fixed at this value, the remainder of the optimization problem is
to maximize L1R1/M subject to (3). But since this problem has already been solved via the
previous analysis, the previous conclusions are unaffected.
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Footnotes
∗We thank Rainald Borck, Kitt Carpenter, and Albert Sole´ Olle´ for helpful comments.
1See, for example, http://reason.org/studies/show/public-sector-private-sector-salary, and
and http://www.prisoncensorship.info/archive/etext/agitation/prisons/campaigns/ca
/caprisoncrat.html (all viewed December 15, 2010).
2See, for example, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10164/1064943-373.stm and
http://blog.nj.com/njv editorial page/2010/02/post 7.html (both viewed December 15,
2010).
3See, for example, http://www.northshoreoflongisland.com/Blog-31542.112114-6239.112114-
Yes-School-Administrators-and-Teachers-are-Vastly-Overpaid.html,
http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2010/09/10/public-sector-
workers-are-the-new-privileged-elite-class.html, and
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/opinion/12brooks.html? r=2&src=tptw
(all viewed December 15, 2010)
4Similar figures are reported for 2009 in Schmitt (2010).
5See, for example, http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20 2 california-unions.html (viewed De-
cember 15, 2010).
6The data are explained in more detail in the notes to the figure, and later in the paper.
7For additional studies, see Albouy (2009), Beeson (1991), Beeson and Eberts (1989), Gabriel
and Rosenthal (2004), Gyourko and Tracy (1989), Gyourko, Kahn and Tracy (1999) and
Henderson (1982).
8Since public-sector workers exploit the mobility of private-sector workers in the process of
rent-seeking, making them mobile as well is theoretically impractical. Presumably, however,
job stability in the public sector leads to much lower interregional mobility for these workers
than for private-sector workers, making our assumption not unrealistic.
9Since the number of public-sector workers is fixed in the model, the empirical analysis focuses
only on public-sector wages and not on employment levels. Putting the model aside, there
is no standard empirical approach that one could adapt for identifying differences in public-
sector employment across states associated with rent-seeking.
10If the amenity were instead gi and its contribution to quasi-linear utility equal to t(gi), a
redefinition that sets ai = t(gi) would yield (1).
11The marginal product could instead depend on a nonlinear function of the amenity, but
suitable redefinition would yield the linear additive relationship (see footnote 10). On an-
other issue, note that the production amenity could reduce costs rather than increase worker
productivity. For example, suppose that heating and cooling cost per worker is given by a
function t(hi), where hi is a measure of climate unpleasantness. Then, with this cost sub-
tracted off from the marginal product in measuring the worker’s contribution, the wage would
equal f ′(Li)− t(hi). This expression can be written as f
′(Li)+ bi by suitable redefinition of
the climate amenity, matching the productivity formulation.
12This formulation assumes that the consumption and production amenities are positively
correlated, with an increase in A generating both consumption and production benefits.
The less natural case where a region’s features yield consumption benefits but reduce worker
productivity can be handled by a reformulation of the model. To capture this case, α would
be negative, so that bi = αA is negative while ai = (1− α)A remains positive.
13It can be shown that the second-order conditions for the maximization problem are satisfied.
14Since the right-hand side of (18) is less than 2/3, the weaker condition L > M = (1/2)(2M)
(indicating that L exceeds half of the total public-sector work force) actually suffices. The
stronger form of the sufficiency condition is needed, however, when housing consumption is
added to the model, as seen below.
15The private-sector wage increase in region 1 is now proportional to −f ′′∂L1/∂A + α =
−f ′′/6g′ + α = α − λ/6. As a result, the regional wage difference is proportional to (α −
λ/6)−λ/6 = α−λ/3. Since this expression is less than unity, the rent-per-worker difference
will exceed it when 2L/3M > 1, as before.
16If public workers were also to consume land, then a change in rent extraction would affect
their utility via the impact of L1 on the h(L1) term, which would be added to (20). This
additional consideration would require a new version of the above analysis, possibly changing
some of the results. In addition, to bring the model fully in line with the Roback tradition,
firms would also be users of land. In this case, the market-clearing conditions would include
this land usage, and a zero-profit condition would be added for each region. These extra
conditions would be needed to determine the quantities of land used in production.
17Another testable prediction of the model is that taxes rise with a region’s amenity level in
order to support higher rent extraction. However, a credible test of this prediction would need
to hold public-good levels constant since the model’s prediction of a uniform z level across
regions is not realistic. This difficulty, combined with the fact that the test would only rely
on a simple cross section at the state level, limits the appeal of such an exercise. In contrast,
for our analysis of wages, we study the difference between public-sector and private-sector
wage differentials associated with amenities, and–as discussed below–the private-sector wage
differentials capture state-level differences that may be correlated with amenities.
18Elementary and secondary school teachers are by far the largest occupation in local govern-
ment, and elementary and secondary school teachers and “bailiffs, correctional officers, and
jailers” (all of which we group under “corrections officers”) are the second and third largest
occupations in state employment (after post-secondary teachers); see Schmitt (2010). We
also focus on corrections officers and elementary and secondary school teachers because their
pay is often prominent in public debate.
19Elementary and secondary school teachers are defined based on the following Census of
Population occupational codes: for 2002 and earlier (1990 Census codes), teachers in kinder-
garten or pre-kindergarten (155), elementary school (156), secondary school (157), or special
education (158); and for 2003 and after (2002 Census codes), preschool and kindergarten
teachers (2300), elementary and middle school teachers (2310), secondary school teachers
(2320), and special education teachers (2330). Correction officers are defined using the same
Census codes as follows: for 2002 and earlier (1990 Census codes), sheriffs, bailiffs, and other
law enforcement officers (423), and correctional institution officers (424); for 2003 and af-
ter (2002 Census codes), first-line supervisors/managers of correctional officers (3700), and
bailiffs, correctional officers, and jailers (3800). Inspection of the share of the workforce in
these two occupation groups as defined indicated that the definitions were consistent across
the change in the data between 2002 and 2003.
20We thank Jed Kolko for supplying us with these estimates.
21Another way to see this point is to note that the public-sector/amenity interactions are still
identified if we include fixed state effects in the regressions.
22Note that the table reports results for specifications including the housing-price premium, in
which case the main effects of the amenities are more reflective of consumption amenities.
In some cases (most notably, perhaps, for workers with a Bachelor’s degree), the estimated
main effects of the amenities do not replicate the negative estimates found for the full sample.
However, in specifications excluding the housing-price premium, the estimated coefficients of
the main effects for most of the amenities were consistently positive, as in Table 5, suggesting
that the value of these amenities on the consumption side may vary across different types
of workers. Regardless, the estimated public-sector/amenity interactions were very similar
when the housing-price premium was excluded. Also, we noted in the previous footnote
that the public-sector/amenity interactions are still identified if we include fixed state effects
(although the main effects of the amenities on public-sector pay are not identified). We
verified that the results for the public-sector/amenity interactions were nearly the same, as
were the statistical conclusions, when we included fixed state effects.
23These are the differences in the public-sector vs. private-sector wage differential. The overall
wage difference for public-sector workers between two states would be this difference plus
the main effect of the amenity, which would be computed by applying the amenity difference
to the estimates in the last four rows of Table 5. Thus, for example, for Proximity, the
implied differential would be 7.7 percent–less than the 10.2 percent figure because the main
effect of this amenity (in the regression controlling for housing prices) is negative.
24Our understanding is that most teachers (except some in prisons and some special needs
teachers) are local-government employees. However, given the heavy involvement of state
government with education, many teachers may report themselves as state employees.
25In the latter case, we are not addressing the potential endogeneity of student-teacher ratios,
and the results must just be interpreted as asking whether the partial correlations between
public-sector wage differentials and amenities remain the same when the student-teacher
ratio is partialed out.
26See http:/www.opm.gov/oca/09tables/locdef.asp (viewed December 30, 2010).
27The negative point estimates could indicate that federal pay differentials do not fully reflect
private differentials.
28In Table 12, the house price premia are excluded. Their inclusion has no effect on the results.
 Figure 1: Plot of Public Sector vs. Private Sector Wage Differentials by State 
 
Notes: Plotted points are state averages of residuals from separate log wage regressions 
estimated for state or local public-sector workers and private-sector workers.  Estimates 
are weighted, and include controls for education (16 categories), age and its square, 
union membership, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, marital status (7 categories), residence 
in a metro area, and year dummy variables.  
Source: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005.
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Distribution of Workers 
by Sector and Union Membership  
  
Public state or local 0.136 
Public state only 0.042 
Public federal 0.026 
Union member 0.156 
Union member and public state or 
local   
0.065 
Union member and public state 
only 
0.015 
Union member and public federal 0.010 
Notes: The sample size is 1,746,644, covering the 48 
continental states.  Estimates are weighted. 
Source: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005. 
 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Amenities by State  
 Mean Std. dev. Min. (state) 5 worst states Max. (state) 5 best states 
Mild -40.1 11.4 -62.7 (ND) ND,MN,SD,ME,VT -17.1 (FL) FL,LA,CA,TX,MS 
Dry -7.5 2.9 -12.1 (LA) LA,MS,WA,AL,GA -1.7 (NV) NV,AZ,NM,WY,ID
Proximity (1,000s) -0.190 0.241 -0.96 (NM) NM,UT,WY,CO,MT -0.010 (DE) DE,RI,NJ,NY,FL 
Density (10,000s) 0.322 0.403 0.075 (AR) AR,MS,WV,SD,VT 2.74 (NY) NY,CA,NJ,IL,MA 
Notes and sources: The data cover the 48 continental states.  Definitions of variables (and sources) are as follows.  “Mild” is the 
negative of the sum of the absolute values of the difference between monthly average temperature and 20 degrees Celsius, summed 
over January, April, July, and October.  “Dry” is the negative of the average monthly precipitation for those four months, in 
centimeters.  Both are county-weighted state averages, using 2006 Census population estimates to weight.  “Proximity” is the negative 
of the average distance from the state’s county centroids, weighted by county population, to the nearest coast, Great Lake, or major 
river.  “Density” is the tract-weighted population density (per square mile) in the state, based on 1990 Census data (Glaeser and Kahn, 
2004).  Note that this is different from a simple density measure for a state, because it is tract-weighted.  The idea is to measure density 
where people in a state live.  As a result, this density measure is much higher than average density measures.  For the 5 worst (best) 
states, the states are listed in increasing (decreasing) order. 
 
 
 Table 3: Standard Wage Regressions Incorporating Amenity Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mild 0.0002 
(0.0012) 
   -0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013 
(0.0004)*** 
Dry  0.010 
(0.003)*** 
  0.012 
(0.002)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
Proximity   0.109 
(0.063)* 
 0.138 
(0.039)*** 
-0.006 
(0.025) 
Density    0.019 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.006)** 
-0.015 
(0.004)*** 
State 
housing 
price 
premium 
($1,000s) 
     0.023 
(0.003)*** 
Notes: The sample size is 1,746,644.  Estimates are weighted.  See notes to Table 4 
for definition of state housing price premia.  The regressions include controls for 
education (16 categories), age and its square, union membership, public state or local 
employment, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, marital status (7 categories), residence in 
a metro area, and year dummy variables.  Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates that the estimate is 
statistically significant at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent level, based on a t-distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of states (clusters) minus one. 
Source: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005. 
 Table 4: Regressions of State Housing Price Premium ($1,000s) on Amenity 
Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mild 0.028 
(0.025) 
   0.038 
(0.018)** 
Dry  0.297 
(0.109)*** 
  0.382 
(0.096)*** 
Proximity   2.330 
(1.839) 
 3.694 
(1.577)** 
Density    1.750 
(0.402)*** 
1.533 
(0.361)*** 
Notes: The sample size is 48.  Estimates are weighted by the same weights used in the 
wage regressions (the CPS earnings weights), which provides approximate weighting by 
population size while weighting observations in different states the same as in the wage 
regressions.  State housing price premia are computed from 2000 Census data (5 percent 
sample), as the state dummy variables in a hedonic regression for house prices.  The 
computational method is the same as in Albouy (2009), although applied at the state level.  
Costs are based on both owned and rented homes and include utility costs, and the 
regression controls for rental and condominium status, dwelling size, rooms, acreage, 
commercial use, kitchen and plumbing facilities, and age of building. 
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 5: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Public State or Local Workers  
  
Union and nonunion public-sector workers vs. all workers 
Only union public-sector 
workers vs. all workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mild 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0012) 
   -0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0014 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0014 
(0.0005)*** 
Dry 
 
 0.009 
(0.003)*** 
  0.011 
(0.002)*** 
-0.0015 
(0.0023) 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
-0.0011 
(0.0024) 
Proximity  
 
  0.089 
(0.061) 
 0.114 
(0.036)*** 
-0.030 
(0.029) 
0.118 
(0.037)*** 
-0.023 
(0.028) 
Density  
 
   0.021 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.007)* 
-0.015 
(0.004)*** 
0.014 
(0.007)** 
-0.014 
(0.005)*** 
Public state or 
local 
-0.047 
(0.010)*** 
-0.046 
(0.010)*** 
-0.044 
(0.007)*** 
-0.044 
(0.010)*** 
-0.042
(0.007)*** 
-0.041 
(0.007)*** 
-0.058 
(0.012)*** 
-0.060 
(0.012)*** 
Housing price 
premium 
($1,000s) 
     0.023 
(0.003)*** 
 0.022 
(0.003)*** 
Public state or 
local × mild 
0.0005 
(0.0009) 
   0.0010 
(0.0006) 
0.0012 
(0.0006)* 
0.0005 
(0.0006) 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
Public state or 
local × dry 
 0.0025 
(0.0042) 
  0.0025 
(0.0026 
0.0024 
(0.0024) 
0.0061 
(0.0035)* 
0.0061 
(0.0038) 
Public state or 
local × 
proximity 
  0.137 
(0.051)*** 
 0.104 
(0.049)** 
0.107 
(0.053)** 
0.324 
(0.097)*** 
0.310 
(0.097)*** 
Public state or 
local × 
density 
   0.033 
(0.009)*** 
0.030 
(0.004)*** 
0.029 
(0.004)*** 
0.035 
(0.007)*** 
0.038 
(0.007)*** 
Joint 
significance 
(p-value) 
    <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Mild + 
interaction 
0.0003 
(0.0018) 
   0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0007) 
-0.0008 
(0.0004)* 
Dry + 
interaction 
 0.0112 
(0.0060)* 
  0.0132 
(0.0026)*** 
0.0009 
(0.0024) 
0.0167 
(0.0043)*** 
0.0050 
(0.0045) 
Proximity + 
interaction 
  0.226 
(0.099)** 
 0.217 
(0.072)*** 
0.077 
(0.036)** 
0.441 
(0.121)*** 
0.287 
(0.081)*** 
Density + 
interaction 
   0.054 
(0.022)** 
0.043 
(0.010)*** 
0.014 
(0.006)** 
0.049 
(0.011)*** 
0.024 
(0.009)*** 
N 1,746,644 1,746,644 1,746,644 1,746,644 1,746,644 1,746,644 1,597,046 1,597,046 
Notes and source: See notes to Tables 3 and 4.  The amenity variables are demeaned (based on the same population weights 
used for the regression, and using the same sample), so that the main effects capture the effect at the sample means.  The 
regressions include controls for education (16 categories), age and its square, sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, marital status (7 
categories), residence in a metro area, federal employment, year dummy variables, a dummy variable for union membership, 
and  interactions between the union membership dummy variable and the amenities included in the specification.  In 
columns 7 and 8 nonunionized public-sector workers are excluded.  The “amenity + interaction” rows report the sum of the 
main amenity effect and its interaction with the public-sector worker variable.  Given that the regressions also include 
union-amenity interactions, these sums should be interpreted as the differences within the union or nonunion sector (and 
only the union sector in columns 7 and 8), and do not reflect differences in unionization between the private and public 
sectors. 
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample. 
 Table 6: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Unionized Public State or Local 
Workers, Sensitivity Analyses  
  
Urban 
 
Non-urban 
Less than 
bachelor’s degree 
Bachelor’s 
degree  
Non-black, 
non-Hispanic 
 
Black 
 
Hispanic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mild 
 
-0.0015 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.0015 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0015 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0012 
(0.0009) 
-0.0011 
(0.0006)* 
-0.0020 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0033 
(0.0002)*** 
Dry 
 
0.0002 
(0.0024) 
-0.010 
(0.004)*** 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Proximity  
 
-0.023 
(0.034) 
-0.039 
(0.031) 
-0.037 
(0.021)* 
0.017 
(0.056) 
-0.006 
(0.030) 
-0.048 
(0.055) 
0.034 
(0.035) 
Density  
 
-0.011 
(0.005)** 
-0.039 
(0.008)*** 
-0.021 
(0.003)*** 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.005)*** 
-0.011 
(0.004)** 
-0.018 
(0.004)*** 
Public state or 
local 
-0.054 
(0.011)*** 
-0.086 
(0.020)*** 
-0.047 
(0.008)*** 
0.058 
(0.012)*** 
-0.076 
(0.012)*** 
0.018 
(0.011) 
0.024 
(0.019) 
Housing price 
premium 
($1,000s) 
0.022 
(0.003)*** 
0.028 
(0.005)*** 
0.023 
(0.002)*** 
0.021 
(0.005)*** 
0.024 
(0.004)*** 
0.021 
(0.003)*** 
0.013 
(0.003)*** 
Public state or 
local × mild 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.0010 
(0.0012) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0012 
(0.0010) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
-0.0002 
(0.0013) 
0.00001 
(0.0018) 
Public state or 
local × dry 
0.0041 
(0.0035) 
0.0043 
(0.0065) 
0.0070 
(0.0025)*** 
0.0053 
(0.0049) 
0.0085 
(0.0037)** 
0.0035 
(0.0048) 
0.0012 
(0.0087) 
Public state or 
local × 
proximity 
0.280 
(0.092)*** 
0.209 
(0.097)** 
0.163 
(0.062)** 
0.364 
(0.102)*** 
0.288 
(0.092)*** 
0.489 
(0.154)*** 
0.231 
(0.126)* 
Public state or 
local × 
density 
0.033 
(0.007)*** 
0.047 
(0.007)*** 
0.031 
(0.005)*** 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.039 
(0.007)*** 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.030 
(0.010)*** 
Joint 
significance 
(p-value) 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Mild + 
interaction 
-0.0009 
(0.0004)** 
-0.0025 
(0.0014)* 
-0.0012 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0024 
(0.0008)*** 
-0.0008 
(0.0005)* 
-0.0022 
(0.0013)* 
-0.0033 
(0.0019)* 
Dry + 
interaction 
0.0042 
(0.0046) 
-0.0061 
(0.0074) 
0.0047 
(0.0032) 
0.0068 
(0.0060) 
0.0080 
(0.0047)* 
0.0057 
(0.0049) 
0.0028 
(0.0087) 
Proximity + 
interaction 
0.257 
(0.069)*** 
0.170 
(0.101)* 
0.125 
(0.059)** 
0.381 
(0.066)*** 
0.282 
(0.073)*** 
0.441 
(0.139)*** 
0.264 
(0.143)** 
Density + 
interaction 
0.022 
(0.010)** 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
0.023 
(0.010)** 
0.010 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
N 1,265,334 331,712 1,184,290 412,756 1,294,598 146,909 159,851 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  Specification and sample, aside from restrictions noted in column heading, are the same as 
in column (7) of Table 5. 
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample. 
 Table 7: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Public State (Only) Workers  
  
Union and nonunion public-sector workers vs. all workers 
Only union public-sector 
workers vs. all workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mild 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0012) 
   -0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013 
(0.0005)** 
Dry 
 
 0.009 
(0.003)** 
  0.011 
(0.002)*** 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
-0.0009 
(0.0023) 
Proximity  
 
  0.095 
(0.061) 
 0.116 
(0.036)*** 
-0.023 
(0.027) 
0.118 
(0.037)*** 
-0.020 
(0.027) 
Density  
 
   0.022 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.007)** 
-0.013 
(0.004)*** 
0.014 
(0.007)** 
-0.013 
(0.004)*** 
Public state or 
local 
-0.042 
(0.008)*** 
-0.042 
(0.008)*** 
-0.039 
(0.006)*** 
-0.038 
(0.009)*** 
-0.035 
(0.007)*** 
-0.034 
(0.007)*** 
-0.050 
(0.011)*** 
-0.054 
(0.012)*** 
Housing price 
premium 
($1,000s) 
     0.022 
(0.003)*** 
 0.022 
(0.003)*** 
Public state or 
local × mild 
-0.00001 
(0.0007) 
   0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0007) 
-0.0005 
(0.0007) 
Public state or 
local × dry 
 0.0010 
(0.0031) 
  0.0020 
(0.0018) 
0.0027 
(0.0016)* 
0.0083 
(0.0036)** 
0.0097 
(0.0037)** 
Public state or 
local × 
proximity 
  0.096 
(0.033)*** 
 0.090 
(0.036)** 
0.106 
(0.042)** 
0.355 
(0.100)*** 
0.339 
(0.105)*** 
Public state or 
local × density 
   0.026 
(0.010)** 
0.018 
(0.007)*** 
0.016 
(0.005)*** 
0.016 
(0.007)** 
0.021 
(0.007)*** 
Joint 
significance 
(p-value) 
    <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Mild + 
interaction 
-0.0001 
(0.0017) 
   -0.0001 
(0.0007) 
-0.0010 
(0.0004)** 
-0.0009 
(0.0008) 
-0.0019 
(0.0005)*** 
Dry + 
interaction 
 0.0099 
(0.0056)* 
  0.0126 
(0.0029)*** 
0.0016 
(0.0025) 
0.0189 
(0.0044)*** 
0.0088 
(0.0044)* 
Proximity + 
interaction 
  0.190 
(0.084)** 
 0.206 
(0.060)*** 
0.082 
(0.033)** 
0.473 
(0.125)*** 
0.319 
(0.092)*** 
Density + 
interaction 
   0.048 
(0.023)** 
0.032 
(0.012)** 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.031 
(0.012)** 
0.008 
(0.009) 
N 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,591,154 1,529,594 1,529,594 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  The only difference relative to Table 5 is that public local workers are omitted. 
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample. 
 
 Table 8: Descriptive Statistics on Distribution of 
Teachers by Sector and Union Membership  
  
Public state or local 0.758 
Public state only 0.096 
Public federal 0.007 
Union member 0.552 
Union member and public state or 
local   
0.507 
Union member and public state 
only 
0.054 
Union member and public federal 0.003 
Notes: The sample is restricted to elementary and secondary 
school teachers, defined based on the following Census of 
Population occupational codes: for 2002 and earlier (1990 
Census codes), teachers in kindergarten or pre-kindergarten 
(155), elementary school (156), secondary school (157), or 
special education (158); and for 2003 and after (2002 Census 
codes), preschool and kindergarten teachers (2300), 
elementary and middle school teachers (2310), secondary 
school teachers (2320), and special education teachers (2330).  
The sample size is 68,127.  See notes to Table 1.   
Source: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005. 
 
 
 Table 9: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Public State or Local 
Teachers  
 Union and nonunion public-sector 
teachers vs. others 
Only union public-sector teachers 
vs. others 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mild 
 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0011 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0011 
(0.0005)** 
Dry 
 
0.0104 
(0.0025)*** 
-0.0012 
(0.0024) 
0.0024 
(0.0028) 
0.0105 
(0.0025)***
-0.0011 
(0.0024) 
0.0026 
(0.0029) 
Proximity  
 
0.113 
(0.035)*** 
-0.026 
(0.028) 
-0.005 
(0.021) 
0.116 
(0.036)*** 
-0.022 
(0.027) 
-0.002 
(0.021) 
Density  
 
0.014 
(0.007)** 
-0.013 
(0.004)*** 
-0.020 
(0.004)*** 
0.014 
(0.007)** 
-0.013 
(0.004)*** 
-0.019 
(0.004)*** 
Public state or local 0.108 
(0.019)*** 
0.109 
(0.018)*** 
0.109 
(0.019)*** 
0.103 
(0.019)*** 
0.103 
(0.019)*** 
0.103 
(0.020)*** 
Teacher -0.179 
(0.016)*** 
-0.177 
(0.016)*** 
-0.178 
(0.016)*** 
-0.179 
(0.016)*** 
-0.177 
(0.016)*** 
-0.177 
(0.016)*** 
Housing price premium 
($1,000s) 
 0.022 
(0.003)*** 
0.024 
(0.002)*** 
 0.022 
(0.003)*** 
0.024 
(0.002)*** 
Student-teacher ratio   -0.005 
(0.002)** 
  -0.005 
(0.002)** 
Student-teacher ratio × 
public teacher  
  0.0011 
(0.0054) 
  0.0054 
(0.0089) 
Public state or local × 
mild 
0.0017 
(0.0007)** 
0.0020 
(0.0007)***
0.0019 
(0.0007)***
0.0004 
(0.0011) 
0.0006 
(0.0011) 
0.0003 
(0.0012) 
Public state or local × 
dry 
0.0023 
(0.0028) 
0.0017 
(0.0026) 
0.0006 
(0.0051) 
0.0085 
(0.0051) 
0.0077 
(0.0052) 
0.0026 
(0.0076) 
Public state or local × 
proximity 
0.253 
(0.056)*** 
0.246 
(0.056)*** 
0.240 
(0.076)*** 
0.474 
(0.130)*** 
0.469 
(0.130)*** 
0.433 
(0.137)*** 
Public state or local × 
density 
0.069 
(0.009)*** 
0.066 
(0.009)*** 
0.068 
(0.010)*** 
0.068 
(0.012)*** 
0.069 
(0.012)*** 
0.074 
(0.015)*** 
Joint significance (p-
value) 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Mild + interaction 0.0013 
(0.0009) 
0.0007 
(0.0007) 
0.0008 
(0.0007) 
-0.00001 
(0.0012) 
-0.0007 
(0.0009) 
-0.0008 
(0.0010) 
Dry + interaction 0.0128 
(0.0039)*** 
0.0005 
(0.0038) 
0.0031 
(0.0053) 
0.0190 
(0.0057)*** 
0.0066 
(0.0060) 
0.0052 
(0.0072) 
Proximity + interaction 0.366 
(0.074)*** 
0.220 
(0.046)*** 
0.235 
(0.073)*** 
0.591 
(0.151)*** 
0.447 
(0.114)*** 
0.431 
(0.132)*** 
Density + interaction 0.081 
(0.015)*** 
0.053 
(0.011)*** 
0.048 
(0.011)*** 
0.082 
(0.017)*** 
0.056 
(0.014)*** 
0.055 
(0.016)*** 
N 1,555,101 1,555,101 1,555,101 1,535,822 1,535,822 1,535,822 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  The only difference relative to Table 5 is that only teachers are included 
among public-sector workers.  The student-teacher ratio is demeaned (based on the same population 
weights used for the regression, and using the same sample), so that the main effects capture the effect at 
the sample means.   
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample; student-teacher ratios are for 2007-8, and 
are taken from http://www.nea.org/home/29402.htm (viewed October 13, 2010). 
  
 Table 10: Descriptive Statistics on Distribution of 
Corrections Officers by Sector and Union Membership  
  
Public state or local 0.949 
Public state only 0.481 
Public federal 0.051 
Union member 0.562 
Union member and public state or 
local   
0.541 
Union member and public state 
only 
0.292 
Union member and public federal 0.022 
Notes: The sample is restricted to corrections officers, defined 
based on the following Census of Population occupational 
codes: for 2002 and earlier (1990 Census codes), sheriffs, 
bailiffs, and other law enforcement officers (423, which does 
not include police), and correctional institution officers (424); 
for 2003 and after (2002 Census codes), first-line 
supervisors/managers of correctional officers (3700), and 
bailiffs, correctional officers, and jailers (3800).   The sample 
size is 6,631.  See notes to Table 1.   
Source: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005. 
 
  
 Table 11: Wage Regressions with Public Sector-Amenity Interactions, for Public State or 
Local Corrections Officers 
 Union and nonunion public-sector 
corrections officers vs. others 
Only union public-sector corrections 
officers vs. others 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mild 
 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0012 
(0.0006)* 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013 
(0.0005)** 
-0.0012 
(0.0006)* 
Dry 
 
0.0106 
(0.0025)*** 
-0.0009 
(0.0023) 
-0.0002 
(0.0021) 
0.0106 
(0.0025)***
-0.0008 
(0.0023) 
-0.0002 
(0.0021) 
Proximity  
 
0.117 
(0.036)*** 
-0.020 
(0.026) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
0.117 
(0.036)*** 
-0.019 
(0.026) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
Density  
 
0.014 
(0.007)** 
-0.012 
(0.004)*** 
-0.014 
(0.005)*** 
0.014 
(0.007)** 
-0.012 
(0.004)*** 
-0.014 
(0.005)*** 
Public state or local 0.034 
(0.041) 
0.035 
(0.041) 
0.034 
(0.041) 
0.020 
(0.042) 
0.018 
(0.042) 
0.018 
(0.042) 
Corrections officer 0.003 
(0.038) 
0.003 
(0.038) 
0.003 
(0.038) 
0.003 
(0.038) 
0.003 
(0.038) 
0.003 
(0.038) 
Housing price 
premium ($1,000s) 
 0.022 
(0.003)*** 
0.021 
(0.003)*** 
 0.022 
(0.003)*** 
0.021 
(0.003)*** 
Inmates per officer   -0.003 
(0.004) 
  -0.003 
(0.004) 
Inmates per officer 
× public corrections  
  -0.011 
(0.010) 
  -0.007 
(0.013) 
Public state or local 
× mild 
0.0022 
(0.0012)* 
0.0025 
(0.0012)** 
0.0029 
(0.0014)** 
0.0018 
(0.0010)* 
0.0020 
(0.0011)* 
0.0023 
(0.0015) 
Public state or local 
× dry 
0.0123 
(0.0048)** 
0.0122 
(0.0046)***
0.0142 
(0.0040)***
0.0183 
(0.0043)***
0.0181 
(0.0047)*** 
0.0193 
(0.0048)***
Public state or local 
× proximity 
0.185 
(0.111) 
0.173 
(0.117) 
0.181 
(0.114) 
0.337 
(0.173)* 
0.306 
(0.177)* 
0.3031 
(0.177)* 
Public state or local 
× density 
0.063 
(0.007)*** 
0.064 
(0.007)*** 
0.056 
(0.009)*** 
0.064 
(0.007)*** 
0.067 
(0.007)*** 
0.062 
(0.007)*** 
Joint significance 
(p-value) 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Mild + interaction 0.0018 
(0.0010)* 
0.0012 
(0.0008) 
0.0017 
(0.0009)* 
0.0014 
(0.0010) 
0.0007 
(0.0007) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
Dry + interaction 0.0229 
(0.0044)*** 
0.0114 
(0.0039)*** 
0.0140 
(0.0041)*** 
0.0289 
(0.0044)*** 
0.0172 
(0.0047)*** 
0.0192 
(0.0051)*** 
Proximity + 
interaction 
0.302 
(0.135)** 
0.154 
(0.102) 
0.166 
(0.099) 
0.455 
(0.197)** 
0.287 
(0.164)* 
0.288 
(0.164)* 
Density + 
interaction 
0.077 
(0.010)*** 
0.051 
(0.007)*** 
0.043 
(0.008)*** 
0.078 
(0.009)*** 
0.054 
(0.007)*** 
0.049 
(0.006)*** 
N 1,510,381 1,510,381 1,510,381 1,507,178 1,507,178 1,507,178 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  The only difference relative to Table 5 is that only corrections officers 
are included among public-sector workers.  The inmate-officer ratio is demeaned (based on the same 
population weights used for the regression, and using the same sample), so that the main effects 
capture the effect at the sample means.   
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample; inmate-staff ratios are taken from 
Stephan (2008, Appendix Table 14).
 Table 12: Falsification Test, Wage Regressions with Public Sector-
Amenity Interactions, for Public Federal Workers  
 Union and nonunion federal 
public-sector workers vs. all 
private workers 
Only union federal public-
sector workers vs. all 
private workers 
 (1) (2) 
Mild 
 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
Dry 
 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
Proximity  
 
0.119 
(0.037)*** 
0.118 
(0.037)*** 
Density  
 
0.015 
(0.007)** 
0.015 
(0.007)** 
Public federal 0.098 
(0.010)*** 
0.013 
(0.007)* 
Public federal 
× mild 
0.00004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
Public federal 
× dry 
-0.0058 
(0.0024)** 
-0.0094 
(0.0025)*** 
Public federal 
× proximity 
-0.058 
(0.044) 
-0.106 
(0.046)** 
Public federal 
× density 
-0.022 
(0.009)** 
0.004 
(0.005) 
N 1,504,288 1,469,974 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3-5.  The only difference relative to Table 5 is that 
only federal workers are included among public-sector workers.  The housing 
cost premia are excluded.  
Sources: CPS ORG files, 1994-2005; 2000 Census 5% sample. 
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